Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies
Volume 5

Article 18

1-1-1996

The GATT and the Unmaking of International Environmental Law
Robert Weir

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 3.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Robert Weir, "The GATT and the Unmaking of International Environmental Law" (1996) 5 Dal J Leg Stud 1.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For
more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

ARTICLES
THE GATT AND THE UNMAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
ROBERT WEIRt

This paper examines the uneasy relationship between the regulation of
international trade and international environmental law. In particular, it
focusses on two GATT panel decisions that struck down US.-imposed trade
embargoes on tuna products imported from countries that the US. considered
killed too many dolphins in their tuna fisheries. The implications of the
decisions went far beyond the immediate environmental issue that faced the
GATT panels, bringing into question the validity of trade sanctions as a
means of enforcing and strengthening existing multilateral environmental
agreements. At the same time, however, a critical examination of the
American position reveals serious flaws in the environmental policy the trade
embargoes were meant to support. The article, therefore, concludes that more
effective international environmental regulations are best pursued through
cooperative initiatives on the international stage.
Cet article examine !es relations troub!ees entre la reglementation du
commerce exterieur et le droit internationale de l'environnement. En
particulier, !'article examine deux decisions des tribunaux sous le GATT qui
ont annulees deux embargos imposes par !es Etats-Unis sur du thon importe
qui venait des pays qui, selon !es Etats-Unis, ont tue trop de dauphins
pendant la peche au thon. Les consequences des decisions vont au-dela de la
question precise devant !es tribunaux sous le GA TT. !ls mettent en doute la
validite des sanctions pour renforcer et ameliorer !es accords internationals sur
l'environnement. Cependant, au meme temps, une analyse critique de la
position americaine souleve des graves problemes dans la politique
environnementale que le embargos devaient soutenir. L 'article conclut done
que la reglementation internationale de l'environnement doit se faire a partir
d'initiatives cooperatrices.

t B.A. (Toronto), LLB. anticipated 1996 (Dalhousie).
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 30, 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (the GATT) was opened for signature. 1 The GATT was seen by
its promoters as a means to achieve international economic stability
through the liberalization of trade practices. The post-war economic
order was to be built around free enterprise and access to markets,
rather than the protectionism that had characterized the pre-war
period; under the GATT trade disputes would be defused through
independent arbitration and negotiation before they could lead to
wider conflicts. 2
At the same time, international concern for environmental law
was incipient. Development of an international regime for the
regulation of trade disputes took priority on the diplomatic stage.
The logic of the elevation of international trade concerns over
international environmental issues was clear: Nations had gone to
war over trade but they had not done so over the environment. As
well, there was little awareness of the potential environmental
impact from the accelerated development of technology that
occurred as part of the war effort and the diffusion of this
technology throughout the world in the liberalized post-war
economic order. 3 International peace and security would be
achieved through harmonious trade practices. There is evidence that
the imbalance between trade and the environment as issues of
international importance remains today, despite the increased
awareness that degradation of the global environment is as serious a
threat to international health and security as economic instability.
Two recent GATT Dispute Settlement Panel decisions have
highlighted this imbalance. Both decisions concerned u.s. trade
embargoes on the importation of tuna products that had been
harvested with unacceptably high levels of incidental dolphin
mortality. The first panel decision challenged the primary nation

1 General Agreement on Tariffi and Trade, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
reprinted in 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
2 For a complete discussion of the history of GATT, see P. Hallstrom, The CATT
Panels and the Formation of International Trade Law (Stockholm: Juristforlaget,
1994) at 22-47 [hereinafter The CATT Panels].
3 For a discussion of the effects of this rapid technological growth on fisheries resources, see G.D. Taylor, "The Collapse of the Northern Cod Fishery: A Historical
Perspective" (1995) 18 Dalhousie L.J. 5.

THE GATT AND THE ENVIRONMENT

3

embargo [Tuna/Dolphin I].4 The second challenge was brought
when Mexico declined to press its victory before the GATT Council
and concerned both the primary and secondary nation embargoes
[Tuna/Dolphin IIJ.5 In both cases, the GATT panels found that the
u.s. was in violation of international trade standards and that the
environmental concern argued in defence of the embargoes-the
protection of dolphins-did not justify the violations. The
environmental ramifications of the decisions are far-reaching; the
decisions bring into question the validity of using trade embargoes
as a tool for environmental protection. These decisions may serve to
undermine the effectiveness of such multi-lateral agreements as the
Montreal Protocol, the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES) and the South Pacific Driftnet
Convention, all of which sanction the use of trade measures to
enforce international environmental obligations.
At the same time, however, the imposition of the unilateral
trade embargoes by the u .s. raises significant problems for the
future development of international environmental law. South
nations have decried the use of unilateral trade embargoes by
developed countries as an intrusion into their sovereignty.
Specifically, they find it particularly ironic (and inequitable) that
they are being asked to bear costs to address global environmental
problems that are the by-product of northern industrialization and
the failure of the developed world to internalize environmental
externalities. 6
This viewpoint was only reinforced by regulations that allowed
the u.s. to determine the acceptable level of dolphin kill. As well,
intense competition for tuna resources in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific (ETP) has led to suspicion that the u.s. was not so much
motivated with concerns for dolphins as in conserving its share of
the tuna stocks.7 The u.s. action has, in general, raised the thorny

4

See United States - Restrictions on the Import of Tuna (Mexico v. United States)
Doc. D/S21/R (3 September 1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1564.
5 See United States - Restriction on Tuna Imports (Netherlands v. United States)
GATT Doc. D/S32/6 (20 May 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 844.
6 D.C. Estey, Greening the GATT(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International
Economics, 1994) at 182 [hereinafter Greening the GATT].
7 The Eastern Tropical Pacific region runs from Chile to Southern California.
The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization has reported that stocks
of yellowfin tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific, at which the embargo was aimed,
GATT
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issue of whether or not one country can impose unilateral
environmental policies on the international community.
While the u. s. has pursued a unilateralist approach, other
nations have disavowed this methodology in favour of a multilateral
approach to the creation of environmental regulation of living
resources. The South Pacific states have effectively banned largescale pelagic driftnet fishing in their waters. This ban has in turn
been taken up on an international scale. The experiences of the u.s.
and the South Pacific states merits comparison.
This paper will take a critical view of the GATT decisions and the
unilateral action undertaken by the u.s .. First, the Tuna/Dolphin II
decision will be analyzed and its implications for the future of
international environmental law highlighted. Second, the
effectiveness of unilateral trade sanctions will be considered.
Finally, the paper will consider more effective ways of making and
enforcing environmental laws on an international scale through an
analysis of the experience of the South Pacific driftnet fishery.

II.

THE TUNA/DOLPHIN PROBLEM

In the ETP dolphins travel in the company of yellowfin tuna.
Fishers, using a technique called "fishing on dolphins,'' spot herds
of dolphins moving along the surface of the ocean. They then
pursue and encircle the dolphins with large purse seine nets. The
nets are wynched at the top and bottom, trapping both the
dolphins at the surface and large schools of tuna travelling beneath
the dolphins. Enmeshed, the dolphins either drown or injure
themselves trying to escape. Dead dolphins are not weighed,
processed, or sold; they are merely thrown overboard.
Estimates of the number of dolphins killed in purse seining vary
widely. Environmental groups have estimated that 1,650,00
dolphins were killed in the 1980s-an average of 23 dolphins per
hour. 8 More conservative estimates put the dolphin mortality for
are fully exploited. One of the reasons for the state of the stocks is the failure of nations fishing in this region to agree on adequate conservation measures. See World
Review of Highly Migratory Species and Straddling Stocks: PAO Fisheries Technical
Paper No. 337 (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations,
1994).
s Animal Rights: Heinz, Purina, and All Canned Tuna, National Boycott News,
Spring/Summer 1989, cited in K.L. Holland, "Exploitation on Porpoise: The Use
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the same period at approximately 750,000. 9 Reasons for the
discrepancies reflect both the politically charged nature of this
issue-mortality rates can be used to sway or soothe public
opinion- and the simple fact that there has been little accurate
reporting of dolphin mortality. 10 However, both perspectives agree
that the incidence of mortality has been in steady decline for the
past two decades largely due to the corresponding decline in
yellowfin tuna stocks. Recent studies estimate that dolphin stocks
in the ETP are stable and some are increasing. 11
1. Background to Tuna/Dolphin II

(i) The US. Legislation
In 1972, the u.s. government enacted the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA). 12 The MMPA seeks to reduce the incidental
bycatch of marine mammals in the commercial fishery. Subsection
101 (a) reads:
S. 101 (a) There shall be a moratorium on the taking and
importation of marine mammals and mammal
products ... during which time no permit may be issued
for the taking of any marine mammal and no marine
mammal product may be imported into the United
States except in the following cases:
(2) Marine mammals may be taken incidentally in the
course of commercial fishing operations and permits may
be issued ....

The MMPA provides for a complicated regulatory scheme under
which permits or exemptions to section 101 are issued. The
regulations establish the ceiling for incidental dolphin kill in the
of Purse Seine Nets by Commercial Tuna Fisherman in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific" (1991) 17 Syracuse]. Int'! L. & Com. 267 at note 32.
9 Tuna: Current Issues Affecting the U.S. Industry: Report to the Committee on
Finance (Washington, D.C.: United States International Trade Commission,
1992)(Chair: D.E. Newquist) at 3-3 [hereinafter USITC Report].
10 It should be noted that in 1991 the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (IATTC) implemented an observer plan to better determine and monitor annual mortality figures in the ETP fishery (ibid. at 3-9).
11 National Research Council, Dolphins and the Tuna Industry (Washington
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992).
12 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(1988 & Supp. II 1990).
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yellowfin fishery for u.s. fishers. 13 The regulations also make it
illegal to import into the u.s. any fish product where that product
has involved an incidental kill of marine mammals above the u.s.
standards. 14 Under section 101 of the MMPA the Secretary of the
Treasury is mandated to impose trade embargoes on fishing nations
who exceed the u.s. standards or do not have a "comparable"
regulatory program. 15 This is referred to as the primary nation
embargo. Paragraph 101(2)(C) extends the embargo to
intermediary nations unless those nations can provide reasonable
proof that they have not imported yellowfin tuna or yellowfin tuna
products from nations subject to the primary nation embargo
within the preceding six months. 16
The underlying purpose of the embargoes reflects an uneasy
alliance between environmental concerns and natiQnal economic
self-interest. On the one hand, environmentalists argue that the
sanctions are a "fundamental component of the international effort
to ... address the largest slaughter of marine mammals in the
world." 17 On the other hand, the embargoes are justified by the
need to protect u.s. fishers, who are subject to the environmental
regulations, from foreign fishers who would otherwise have a
competitive advantage in the u.s. market if they were not subject to

l3 Operational Regulations for Tuna Fishermen, 50 CFR Ch. II§ 219.22 (1990).
The regulations establish the total numbers of marine mammals that can be taken in
a year. See§§. (d)(A)(2). They set up a sliding scale of penalties for fishers who exceed their permitted kill. This scale slides from participation in marine mammal
safety training to revocation of the fishing permit. See§§. (d)(E)(F) &(G). An operator's permit will only be suspended if the total allowable kill on three consecutive
trips is exceeded.
14 Ibid. §§. (e).
15 MMPA, 16 U.S.C. §. 101(2)(b)(i)&(ii) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
l6 U.S. legislators have enacted several statutes aimed at conserving wildlife in areas outside its national jurisdiction. See e.g. African Elephant Conservation Act of
1988, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4244 (1988); The Endangered Species Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136,
16 U.S.C. §§ 460/-9; & DriftnetActAmendments 16 U.S.C. 1826 (1990). Together
with 1990 amendments to the MMPA, the Driftnet Act Amendments mandate that
trade embargoes are to be imposed on fish products from any nation using a largescale pelagic driftnet. See MMPAAmendments, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(E)(1990).
17 Earth Island Institute, Statement on the Implications ofthe GATT Panel Ruling
on Dolphin Protection and the Environment in GATT: Implications for
Environmental Law, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Health and
Environment, 102 Cong., 1st Sess., (27 September 1991)(Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1991) at 55.
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the same standards. 18 The GATT panels were clearly more concerned
with the latter justification.

(ii) Tuna/Dolphin I
The implementation of the tuna embargoes revealed domestic
tension within the u.s. itself. Environmentalists, frustrated by what
they viewed as a lack of commitment to the goals of the MMPA on
the part of the federal administration, brought an action in u.s.
District Court. 19 The Court, noting that the relevant provisions of
the MMPA were mandatory, granted an injunction forcing the
administration to implement the embargoes. 20
Following the implementation of the primary nation embargo,
Mexico, arguing that its right to sell tuna on the u.s. market had
been violated, requested a GATT dispute-settlement panel to
adjudicate the conflict. The panel ruled in favour of the Mexican
position. The Mexican government, however, declined to submit
the decision to the GATT Council, choosing instead to enter bilateral
consultation with the u.s. to resolve the matter. As a result of the
Mexican response, the GATT decision in Tuna/Dolphin I had no
precedential .value and the embargo remained in effect. 21
Dissatisfied with the end result of Tuna/Dolphin I, the European
Union (Eu) and the Netherlands as co-complainants requested the

18

M.H. Hurlock, "The GATT, u.s. Law and the Environment: A Proposal to
Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision" (1992) 92 Columbia
L.R. 2098 at 2112.
19 Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F. 2d 1449 (1991). The imposition of
the embargoes was opposed by Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher, U.S.
Ambassador to Mexico John Negroponte, and Assistant Administrator for Fisheries
William Fox Jr., leading to accusations that the administration was willing to use
environmental bargaining chips in the NAFTA negotiations with Mexico. See Earth
Island Institute, supra note 17 at 60.
20 The nations initially listed under the primary nation embargo were Mexico,
Ecuador, Panama and Vanuatu. Following an agreement to place international observers on board their purse seiners, Ecuador and Panama were taken off the list. On
October 26, 1992, four nations were subject to the intermediary nation embargo:
Costa Rica, Italy, Japan and Spain. This was down from a total of 21 the previous
January. See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 2.14.
21 See Greening the GATT, supra note 6 at 268. For a more complete discussion
of GATT procedure and state practice under the GATT, including bilateral consultation, see The GATT Panels, supra note 2 at 11-21.
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formation of a second dispute settlement panel to consider both the
primary and intermediary nation embargoes. 22

2. Tuna/Dolphin II
The u.s. presented two defences for the use of the embargoes
before the GATT Dispute Settlement Panel. First, they argued that
the embargoes were justified under Article III. Article III, the
national treatment obligation, requires that products imported into
a country cannot be treated differently from "like domestic
products." 23 Failing this, the u.s. argued that the embargoes were
nonetheless justified under the general exemptions set out in Article
XX. Specifically, the u.s. argued that the trade embargoes were
either aimed primarily at the conservation of an exhaustible natural
resource (Article XX(g)) or necessary to protect animal life (Article
XX(b)). The panel ruled against the u.s. on both arguments.

(i) Article III
The interpretation given to Article III by the GATT panel turned on
a very precise reading of the term "product." The u.s. held that
since the domestic tuna industry was subject to the same
restrictions on dolphin mortality as the foreign industry, this did
not constitute a discriminatory trade practice. In other words, they
were applying the same regulatory standards to foreign products as
they were to their own. The EU and the Netherlands maintained
that the u.s. regulations were aimed not at tuna as a product but at
the production methods employed in harvesting tuna, namely

22

Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Thailand and Venezuela supported the
position as interested third parties. The U.S. found no international support for
its position.
23 Article III:2 reads:

EU

The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
transportation, distribution or use .... See GATT, supra note 1,
reprinted in Tuna/Dolphin II at 889 [emphasis added in panel
decision].
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incidental dolphin kill. Hence, the u.s. measures were excluded by
the wording of Article III, which only applied to products and not
to production methods. 24 Essentially, this was the same argument
that had succeeded in Tuna/Dolphin I, and the second panel
applied the reasoning of the first.
The panel ruled that the u.s. measures were taken in relation to
production and had nothing to do with product. As a result, the
panel held that Article III "could not apply to the enforcement at
the time or point of importation of laws, regulations or
requirements that related to policies or practices that could not affect
the product as such." [emphasis added]2 5 By separating products
from their methods of production, the panel was then able to
determine that the u.s. embargo was a quantitative restriction. As
such, it was inconsistent with Article XI, which generally prohibits
such trade restrictions. 26
(ii) Article XX

The u.s. argument centred around the GATT exceptions in Article
XX. 27 Article XX allows contracting parties to impose quantitative

24 See Tuna/Dolphin
25 See ibid.
26 Article XI: 1 reads:

II, supra note 5 at para. 5.8.

No prohibitions of restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges ... shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any
other contracting party.
See GATT, supra note 1, reprinted in Tuna/Dolphin II at para. 5.10.
Article XX(b) and Article XX(g) read:

27

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures:

(b) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health:

10
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trade restrictions in certain circumstances. Because the drafters of
the GATT were cautious about allowing parties to impose such
restrictions (for fear that these restrictions may be abused to create
disguised trade barriers), GATT panels have consistently given Article
XX a narrow interpretation. 28 The Tuna/Dolphin II panel affirmed
this interpretative strategy: "The long-standing practice of panels
has accordingly been to interpret [Article XX] narrowly, in a
manner that preserves the basic objectives and principles of the
General Agreement." 2 9 Thus, the trade interests protected under
the GATT are raised above environmental concerns in interpreting
Article XX. 3o
The narrow interpretation of Article XX led to two key
determinations by the panel. The first determination concerned the
"extra-jurisdictional" impact of the u.s. regulations. The u.s. argued
that there was no territorial limitation on measures that a
contracting party could take outside its jurisdiction to protect
"exhaustible natural resources." In support of its position, the u.s.
pointed to several bilateral and multilateral environmental treaties
that "provided for [trade] measures outside of the territorial
jurisdiction of the country taking the measures." 31 In disposing of
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic products.
See GATT, supra note l, reprinted in Tuna/Dolphin II at 5.29 & 5.12.
28 Future panels may narrow the interpretation further. The recently completed
Uruguay Round Agreement, stipulates that any quantitative trade restrictions must
be subject to a "least trade-restrictive" test. See Greening the GATT, supra note 6 at
50.
2 9 See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 5.26.
30 It has been noted that Article XX does not include specific reference to the environment. See Greening the GATT, supra note 6 at 49; M.H. Hurlock, supra note
18 at 2107. While Article :XX(b) permits restrictions necessary to protect human life
it is unclear whether this exception would cover such diffuse areas as ozone protection. As well, evidentiary problems in connecting trade actions taken in response to
ozone depletion to the protection of human life would be enormous.
3l See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 3.23. The U.S. cited the enforcement provisions in the 1933 Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and
Flora in Their Natural State; the 1940 Convention on Nature Protection and Wild
Life Preservation in the Western Hemisphere; the 1950 International Convention for
the Protection of Migratory Birds; the 1973 Agreement of the Conservation of Polar
Bears; the 1976 Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals; and the
1989 Convention on the Prohibition of Fishing with Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnets in
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the panel

[T]he agreements cited by the parties to the dispute were
bilateral or plurilateral agreements that were not
concluded among the contracting parties to the General
Agreement, and they did not apply to the interpretation
of the General Agreement or the application of its
provisions. 32

At the same time that the panel dismissed the environmental
agreements as an interpretative aid to the GATT, it held that nothing
in the wording of Article XX precluded states from taking actions
outside their national jurisdiction to conserve exhaustible natural
resources. Some writers have suggested that this represents a
substantive step in the interpretation of the GATT and its application
to international environmental law. 33 However, a closer reading of
the panel report suggests that what it had in mind are trade
restrictions related to the activity of nationals in a foreign
jurisdiction, such as vessels flying the flag of the restricting state,
rather than restrictions placed on the activity of other contracting
parties. 34
The second determination focussed on the wording of Article
XX(g). While the panel was willing to accept that dolphins were "an
exhaustible natural resource" that fell within the wording of Article
XX(g)35 and a policy to conserve dolphins could be seen as a policy
to conserve such a resource, the panel narrowed the ambit of Article
XX(g). The panel held that the words "related to" the conservation
of an exhaustible natural resource had to mean "primarily aimed at"
conservation.3 6 The panel then went on to find that the u.s. trade
restrictions were not, in fact, primarily aimed at the conservation of
an exhaustible natural resource but were "measures taken to force
the South Pacific. See ibid. at para. 3.21. As well, the U.S. pointed to trade restriction provisions in The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species and The
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste
and their Disposal. See ibid. at para. 3.23.
32 Ibid. at para 5.19.
33 See Greening the GATT, supra note 6 at 269.
34 See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 5.17.
35 See ibid. at para. 5.13.
36 See ibid. at para. 5.21.
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other countries to change their policies. "37 As such, they were not
excepted from the general provision of the GATT.
The logical separation in the reasoning of measures aimed at
conservation from those aimed at other states' practices is
perplexing. The trade embargo, in order to be effective in
conserving the exhaustible natural resource, necessarily had to
influence the policy and practice of foreign states. It was exactly
those policies and practices, after all, that were contributing to high
levels of dolphin mortality. However, any trade action taken to
accomplish this end would automatically violate the GA TT. The
panel justifies this shift through GATT-specific principles:
If... Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting
parties to take trade measures so as to force other
contracting parties to change their policies within their
jurisdiction, including their conservation policies, the
balance of rights and obligations among contracting
parties, in particular the right of access to markets, would
be seriously impaired. [emphasis added]3 8

The u.s. fared no better under the interpretation of Article
XX(b). The GATT panel again narrowed the reading of "necessary"
in the Article. The panel asserted that in order for a trade restriction
to be necessary for the protection of animal life there had to be no
less restrictive-or GATT-consistent-option available to the
offending state. Recalling its reasoning under Article XX(g), the
panel held that measures taken to force other nations to change
their policies could not be necessary for the protection of animal
life. 39 Unfortunately, the panel provides no discussion on what less
restrictive measures could be considered necessary. It seems that
any trade measure that has the effect of influencing policies or
practices of other states cannot be "necessary," within the meaning
of Article XX(b), or "primarily aimed" at the conservation of a
natural resources, within the meaning of Article XX(g).

See ibid. at para. 5.27.
Ibid. at para. 5.26.
39 See ibid. at para. 5.38.

37
38
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(iii) Implications of the Panel Decision for International Environmental
Law
The GATT ruling underscored a number of problems already extant
in international environmental law. The decision further questioned
the effectiveness and, indeed, the integrity of environmental
agreements negotiated at multilateral fora. By refusing to recognize
the spirit and validity of many of these agreements, the GATT panel
effectively made soft law even softer. Without acknowledging the
importance of non-trade issues, such as the environment, the panel
ignored the international consensus embodied in these agreements.
The applicability of the enforcement provisions in these agreements
has been seriously undermined. It is doubtful that a trade embargo
enacted pursuant to one of these agreements would be sanctioned
under the GATT.
The interpretation of Article III further limits the breadth of
international environmental agreements. For instance, Article 4(5)
of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, (the Montreal
calls on parties to determine the
feasibility of banning or restricting importation of products that,
while in themselves are harmless to the ozone layer, have been
produced with ozone depleting substances. Following the GATT
decision, such trade restrictions would not meet the national
treatment obligation in Article III. A party to the Montreal Protocol
can impose trade embargoes on ozone-depleting products,
provided similar domestic restrictions are in force, but not products
manufactured with ozone-depleting production methods. The
GA TT decision in Tuna/Dolphin II leaves little room for
acknowledging that pollution is a transboundary problempollution in one state has direct environmental consequences on
neighbouring states. It also fails to recognize that the protection of
such "environments" as the ozone layer is, by nature, a global
problem requiring global remedies. 41 The international community

40

Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone,
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 539 (1991).
41 The implications of the decision, of course, reach far beyond the Montreal
· Protocol and other international environmental agreements. German environmental lobbyists, for instance, have lobbied hard to get their government to impose restrictions on the importation of Canadian hardwood products because of the
clearcutting technique used by the forestry industry. Following the reasoning in
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has agreed that trade embargoes are an appropriate enforcement
tool; the GATT ruling has now declared such measures to be invalid.
The protection of endangered species is also undermined by the
GA TT decision. While the GATT ruling is hostile towards import
restrictions aimed at production methods, it is in some ways more
hospitable to international agreements such as the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), 42 that target
products such as leopard skin and ivory. 43 Unfortunately, CITES
deals exclusively with international trade in endangered species.
The fact that all cetaceans, including dolphins, are listed on Annex I
and Annex II of CITES does nothing to prohibit incidental dolphin
kill in the tuna fishery, as this is a non-trading issue. 44 In addition,
destruction of species habitat through environmentally harmful
production methods is not addressed in CITES. Trade measures
designed to protect habitat would likely be in violation of the
GATT. 45

In closing its decision, the Tuna/Dolphin II panel delivered this
telling summation:
The Panel noted that the objective of sustainable
development, which includes the protection and
preservation of the environment, has been widely
recognized by the contracting parties to the General
Agreement. The Panel observed that the issue in this
dispute was not the validity of the environmental
objectives of the United States to protect and conserve
dolphins. The issue was whether, in the pursuit of its
environmental objectives, the United States could impose
Tuna/Dolphin II such trade restrictions would not fall within Article III because
they would be targeting production and not product. As well, the restrictions would
not be justified under Article XX(g) because they would be primarily aimed at forcing a foreign government to change its harvesting policies and practices and not at
the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource.
42 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, amended 1979, 1983, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
4 3 See J.P. Trachtman, "GATT Dispute Settlement Panel" 86 American J. ofint'l.
L. 142 at 151.
44 See E.A. Norse, ed., Global Marine Biodiversity: A Strategy for Building
Conservation into Decision Making (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) at 94.
4 5 Such conventions as the Convention on the Conservation ofMigratory Species of
Wild Animals (Bonn Convention), which specifically call for the conservation of
habitat, would also be vulnerable to a GATT challenge if trade measures were enacted
to ban products associated with that habitat destruction.
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trade embargos to secure changes in the policies which
other contracting parties pursued within their own
jurisdiction. 46
Contracting parties are protected from the enforcement provisions
of treaties and agreements, which are aimed at gaining compliance
with international environmental standards, by virtue of having
access to dispute settlement under the GA TT. Progressive
environmental principles, such as sustainable development, have no
persuasive value in the GATT forum.
(iv) Reaction and Responses to the GATT Decisions

Domestic reaction to Tuna/Dolphin I in the United States was
vitriolic. Ralph Nader called the GATT process "antidemocratic" and
predicted that the decision would "turn the GATT into a weapon of
mass destruction for the environment and environmental laws
around the world." 47 Steven Shrybman, counsel for the Canadian
Environmental Law Association, spoke with a more reflective tone:
"In many ways the objectives of liberalized or free trade represent
an agenda for deregulation, and the consequences of such a policy
for the environment are very problematic." 48 The GATT panel in
Tuna/Dolphin II may have had such criticism in mind when they
washed their hands of the issue: "The Panel noted that the
relationship between environment and trade would be considered in
the context of preparations for the organization of the World Trade
Organization. " 49 To date, little progress has been made on
integrating environmental policy with trade issues within the GATT
or the proposed World Trade Organization.5°
More positive responses to Tuna/Dolphin I were reflected in the
ground swell of public and congressional support for building
environmental protection into the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). Pressure on the Bush administration to push
for a side agreement on the environment within the N AFT A

Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 5.42.
Testimony of Ralph Nader before the Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment (27 September 1991), supra note 17 at 63.
48 Testimony of Steven Shrybman before the Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment (27 September 1991), ibid. at 77.
49 Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 5.43.
50 See Greening the GATT, supra note 6 at 50.
46
47
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negotiations has been attributed to the intensity of the national
debate following Tuna/Dolphin l.5 1 In response to the concern over
the incompatibility of GATT with environmental protection, the
GA TT Council called for a meeting of its working group on trade
and the environment. Created in 1972 as part of the general
provisions of the Stockholm Declaration,5 2 the working group had
never met prior to 1991. Moreover, the report submitted by the
group confirmed the panel decision in Tuna/Dolphin I. It
cautioned that environmental protection could be used as a
disguised trade barrier, emphasized the role of GA TT as a trade
panel, and suggested that any moves to incorporate environmental
considerations into the interpretation of the GATT would necessitate
amendments to the General Agreement.53
The call to reform the GATT along environmental lines has been
widely taken up following the decisions. Much of the response has
been creative. Proposals for an amended exception to the GATT, a
hypothetical Article XX(k), have called for recognition that trade
measures taken to enforce multilateral and bilateral environmental
treaties and conventions should serve as a general exclusion to the
trade obligations in the GATT.5 4 As well, broadening Article III to
include production methods would allow countries to target
sources of pollution rather than just harmful products.55 Daniel
Estey has called upon environmentalists to use the GATT as a model
for international dispute resolution. His proposed Global
Environmental Organization would "serve as an honest broker in
transnational environmental disputes, assessing risks and benefits
from environmental threats and allocating costs and cleanup
responsibilities."5 6 While each of these proposals would serve the
desired end of integrating environmental protection into the GATT,

5l P. Low, Trading Free: The GATT and U.S. Trade Policy (New York: The
Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993) at 31.
52 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, 5 June 1972, UN Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11
I.L.M. 1416.
53 See GATT Secretariat 1992 Study on Trade and Environment, cited in The
GATT Panels, supra note 2 at 95.
54 See M.H. Hurlock, supra note 18 at 2148 & Greening the GATT, supra note
6 at 221.
55 See M.H. Hurlock, ibid. at 2157.
56 Greening the GATT, supra note 6 at 230.
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actual moves to amend the GATT have been disappointing.57 It is
ironic that the same states responsible for such documents as the
Montreal Protocol and CITES seem so reluctant to incorporate
similar principles into the GATT.
The above-mentioned proposals all focus on multilateral
solutions to the concerns raised in the Tuna/Dolphin decisions.
Other proposals, such as amending Article XX(b) to include
protection of the environment, 58 leave room for unilateral trade
measures outside of existing international agreements. Underlying
the Tuna/Dolphin II decision, however, is a reluctance to sanction
unilateral trade measures. In this way, the GA TT reflects many
concerns existing in international law generally. Unilateral action is
viewed by many states as a roadblock to the implementation of
workable international laws. In the environmental regime,
multilateral actions have been effective in developing general
principles as well as effective agreements on conservation and
environmental protection. While the GATT decisions raise serious
questions as to the future enforcement of international
environmental law, it may be equally true that the u .s. action
impedes the progress of effective solutions to global environmental
problems.
III. UNILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE ARGUMENT
AGAINST THE U.S. POSITION

1. Conservation Flaws in the U.S. Regulations

Proponents of the yellowfin tuna embargoes have proffered three
justifications for their implementation: First, they protected
dolphins; second, they were necessary to maintain the competitive

57 The recently completed Uruguay Round amendments to the GATT on countervailing measures and subsidies have again failed to include environmental protection on the list of GATT exceptions, although they were brought up in the negotiations. The Uruguay Round has confirmed that lower environmental standards in
the exporting country are not a justification for countervailing measures. See The
GATT Panels, supra note 2 at 91.
58 See C. Arden-Clarke, "The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development", World Wildlife
Discussion Paper Qune 1991), cited in M.H. Hurlock, supra note 18 at note 302.
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equality of u.s. tuna fishers;59 and third, they represented u.s.
frustration with the failure of enforcement mechanisms in existing
multilateral environmental agreements. Indeed, the GATT decisions,
in many ways, underscore the failure of the international
community to implement effective rules concerning environmental
protection. 60 These proponents, however, have largely ignored the
effect of these regulations on the conservation prospects for
yellowfin tuna.
The first thing to recognize in addressing unilateral
enforcement of conservation regulations is that those standards are
not open to criticism or input from countries with a similar interest
in the yellowfin resource. By placing itself on a higher moral plane
than other nations in the ETP, the u.s. was asserting a preferential
right in the reduction of dolphin mortality. However, the u.s.
regulations do not seriously reduce the potential numbers of
dolphins killed. Under the regulations the total allowable kill in
1993 for all dolphin species in the yellowfin fishery exceeds
50,000, 61 a number well higher than even conservative estimates of
total annual kill in the ETP. 62 Further, the experience of u.s. tuna
fishers in the ETP showed that the regulations were not working.
The USITC reported that the u.s. fishers who remained in the ETP,
like most foreign fishers, were forced to sell their yellowfin catches
on foreign markets because "much of the harvest was dolphin unsafe."63 As well, the stipulated kill per set of 3.89, when applied to
smaller fishing nations, does not equitably address overall stock
abundance. A country with a comparatively small purse seining
fleet-such as Vanuatu, which was put under the primary nation
embargo when its fishers exceeded u.s. prescribed levels in 1988 64is subject to the same restrictions as the more extensive fleet of the
United States. While smaller fishing states do not contribute to
overall depletion of dolphin stocks to the extent that the larger
fleets of Mexico and the United States do, they are nonetheless

59 See discussion supra note 7.
60

See J.P T rachtman, supra note 43 at 151.

61 Operational Regulations far Tuna Fishermen, supra note 13 at§§. d(A)(2).
62 The total incidental kill of dolphins in the ETP for 1991 was 27,300. See usrTC
Report, supra note 9 at 3-2.
63 Ibid. at 3-18.
64 Jbid. at 3-7.
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subject to the same regulatory burden. 65 The u.s. regulations have
the effect of making each participant in the yellowfin fishery
equally responsible for dolphin conservation without considering
the relative impact each participating state has on overall dolphin
mortality.
The second flaw in the regulations and the enforcement of the
embargoes is that they may have had a negative impact on the
conservation of the yellowfin stocks in the ETP. Herds of dolphins
in the ETP associate with schools of moderate to large yellowfin.66
One of the adverse effects of the embargoes was to force nations to
target smaller yellowfin before they had reproduced. Venezuela
argued that the u.s. regulations were short-sighted and threatened
the long-term viability of the tuna stocks. The Venezuelans stated:
"The embargos ... were not only barriers to trade but [barriers] to
responsible eco-system management." 67 The exclusive focus on
dolphins may have blinded the u.s. to broader concerns of species
bio-diversity and eco-system management.
A third flaw in the u.s. regulatory system is that it did not
encourage or promote more sustainable fishing methods but
preserved the purse seiner status quo. Bait fishing or long liners do
not involve incidental dolphin mortality. As well, lower yields in the
tuna harvest associated with these techniques assist the long-term
sustainability of the resource. Because purse seining is economically
more efficient in the short-term, the u.s. position has been to focus
on modifications of current methods. 68 Unfortunately, the National
Research Council reports that it was
unable to identify any currently available alternative to
setting nets on dolphins that is as efficient as dolphin
seining ... [or] any experimental modifications to gear
or techniques of catching dolphin-associated tuna that

65

For a description of the fleet sizes of the participants in the ETP yellowfin fishery, see Ad Hoc Consultation on the Role of Regional Fishery Agencies in Relation to
High Seas Fishery Statistics: PAO Fisheries Report No. 500 (Rome: Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 1994).
66 A. Wild, "A Review of the Biology and Fisheries for Yellowfin Tuna, Thunnus
Albacares, in the Eastern Pacific Ocean", in Interactions of Pacific Tuna Fisheres:
PAO Fisheries Technical Paper 33612 (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization
of the United Nations, 1991) 52 at 73.
67 See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 4.37.
68 See National Research Council, supra note 11 at 3.
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would reduce dolphin mortality to or near to zero and
would be practical in the fishery in the immediate
future. 69

The embargoes ultimately may have an adverse effect on the
tuna stocks of the central and western pacific. The USITC reported
that efforts to minimize costs and improve efficiency in the u.s.
tuna harvesting and processing industry have "mainly been driven
by economic considerations such as the cost of energy and
labour. "7o The higher costs associated with compliance with the
dolphin-safe policy have been partially blamed for the migration of
the majority of the u.s. purse seiners from the ETP to the western
and central pacific.7 1 As well, the bulk of u.s. capital investment in
tuna processing avoided adverse economic impacts altogether by
being relocated to countries in the western pacific not subject to the
embargoes-a fact which proves that global capital, like pollution
and tuna fish, is highly migratory and difficult to regulate.7 2
Increased pressure on the central and western pacific fisheries from
the economic calculations of the u.s. industry may have long-term
detrimental effects on tuna stocks in those regions.
Another plausible reason for the migration of u.s. industry to
the western and central pacific is that, unlike their counterparts in
the ETP, stocks of yellowfin tuna in these regions are relatively
healthy.73 In 1960, the u.s. caught and processed 90% of the ETP
tuna. By 1991, due to the expansion in the fleet sizes of Mexico,
Ecuador and Panama, the u.s. share of the resource had been
reduced to 11 %.7 4 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, members of
the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) refused to

69

Ibid at 8.
Report, supra note 9 at 5-1.
7! In 1989, 29 U.S. vessels, accounting for 26% of the total yellowfin harvest, operated in the ETP. See National Research Council, supra note 11 at 29. By 1992,
only nine purse seiners remained in the ETP, while the number operating in the
western and central pacific had increased from 30 in 1988 to 43 in 1992. See USITC
Report, supra note 9 at D-5.
72 As of 1990, only one of the major U.S. tuna processors was operating within
the U.S .. The others had sold their interests to Thai and Indonesian companies. See
National Research Council, ibid at 31.
73 Yellowfin stocks in the central and western pacific are lightly exploited. See
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 337, supra note 7 at 27.
74 See National Research Council, supra note 11 at 3.
70 USITC
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adhere to the catch limits set by the regulatory body because
countries such as Mexico, who did not participate in IATTC, were
operating independent of international regulatory control.75 As a
result, IATTC lost all credibility as an effective regulatory body76 and
the yellowfin tuna stocks are now fully exploited.77 The same
misfortune may befall the stocks of the western and central pacific.

2. The U.S. Action Under International Law: Rio and UNCLOS
Intense competition for yellowfin tuna resources in the ETP led the
Australians to suggest that the regulatory measures taken by the u.s.
to limit dolphin mortality were, in fact, aimed at controlling the
international trade in ETP yellowfin tuna.78 Their statement reflects
a general suspicion of the American policy. The u.s. holds 31 % of
the world's tuna market.79 By closing that market to dolphin-unsafe
tuna caught in the ETP, the u.s. could confer an economic
advantage on their tuna fishers who had largely moved away from
the ETP, while at the same time forcing nations fishing in the ETP to
find other markets or catch less tuna. This theory, however, is
insupportable for a number of reasons. One, it was
environmentalists who forced the administration to impose the
embargoes. Two, part of the reason the u.s. fishers left the ETP was
due to the increased cost of meeting the regulatory standards.

75 See usrTc Report, supra note 9 at 4-3.
76 The current membership in IATTC includes only Costa Rica, France, Japan,
Nicaragua, Panama, the U.S., Vanuatu and Venezuela. Mexico, Ecuador and Chile,
with their large yellowfin fleets, are not members. IATTc's role in the regulation of
the ETP tuna fishery is limited to gathering scientific information, conducting observer programs, and advising the member states on conservation and management
of the stocks. See FAO Fisheries Report No. 500, supra note 65 at 43.
77 See FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 337, supra note 7 at 27. In FAO parlance, "fully exploited" means the stock is fished at its maximum sustainable yield
(MsY). MSY calculations are based on the best available science and have historically
resulted in over-exploitation of stocks managed under this principle. For a more
complete discussion of the flaws inherent in managing fisheries based on MSY, see
R.L. Payne, "A Glance Into the Future of the World Canned Tuna Trade" (1994)
18 Marine Policy 407.
78 See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 4.12.
79 See National Research Council, supra note 11 at 6.
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Finally, the effect of the embargoes proved to be damaging on the
remainder of the domestic processing industry. 80
The suspicion, however, reflects a growing divide in
international environmental law between North and South
countries. Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration states, in part:
Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges
outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should
be avoided. Environmental measures addressing
transboundary or global environmental problems should,
as far as possible, be based on an international
consensus. 81

Principle 12 was drafted to protect the development interests of
South nations, who feared that trade measures would be taken by
North nations to "force acquiescence to northern environmental
priorities over which legitimate disagreement remains regarding the
resulting benefits." 82 The u.s. trade action can be seen as a direct
abrogation of Principle 12. The embargoes placed a heavier burden
on the South nations, where tuna resources contribute more
significantly to their narrower economic bases. In addition, serious
and valid points of disagreement concerning the environmental
soundness of the u .s. regulations were not opened for debate
among the participating nations in the ETP fishery. Instead, the u.s.
used its market strength to force unsound conservation and
resource management strategies on South nations.
This dispute has long been a sore spot in international fisheries
management. South nations, with less developed fisheries
industries, are more dependent on stocks that occur within their
200 mile limit than North nations with their highly capitalized
fleets. After stocks are depleted in one region, the North nations
80 The processing indust1y complained of a number of adverse affects created by
the embargoes: (1) increased public awareness of traditional dolphin-unsafe harvesting practices had decreased demand for tuna even after the canners moved to dolphin-safe labelling; (2) uncertainties in supplies created higher risks; (3) U.S. canners had to compete with the large and growing European market for dolphin-safe
products. See USITC Report, supra note 9 at 3-18. The Report did, however, acknowledge that the increased demand for albacore was an "unambiguously positive"
result of the embargoes for U.S. fishers. See ibid. at 3-21.
81 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN Doc.
NCONF. 151/5/Rev. l, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 at 878.
82 Greening the GATT, supra note 6 at 187.
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move on to less exploited areas, leaving the southern states to suffer
the consequences of overfishing. This pattern, known as "pulse
fishing,'' has not only contributed to the depletion of much of the
world's high seas fisheries 83 but to open distrust of northern motives
surrounding conservation measures. 84 The ease with which the u.s.
fleet was able to relocate its activities may have contributed to the
hostility among Southern nations toward the u.s. trade measures.
The 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea
(uNCLos) 85 mirrors the cooperative approach to transboundary
resource management expressed in Principle 12. UNCLOS recognized
that individual states could not adequately manage transboundary
stocks such as tuna fish. Article 64 mandates states whose nationals
fish for highly migratory species within the same region to
cooperate through international fisheries organizations in the
management and conservation of the species. By taking the issue of
dolphin conservation upon itself, the u.s. was indirectly regulating
the yellowfin tuna resource. In principle, this unilateral action would
amount to a violation of the provisions of UN CLOS. 86
At the Tuna/Dolphin II panel hearing, Venezuela called upon
the u.s. to respect the principle of cooperation enunciated in
UNCLOs.87 Venezuela considered the appropriate mechanism for
regulation of dolphin mortality was through an international
agreement, which would not only represent all interested parties but
could also address the more pressing economic issue of conserving
the yellowfin tuna stocks. 88 Unfortunately, the opposition to the
u.s. dolphin-safe policy highlights the regional antipathies that exist

83 The FAO estimates that 70% of the world's high seas fisheries are either fully
exploited or over exploited. See Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing: PAO
Fisheries Report No. 484 (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations, 1992).
84 See]. Carr & M. Gianni, "High Seas Fisheries, Large-Scale Driftnets, and the
Law of the Sea" in J.M. Van Dyke et al., eds., Freedom for the Seas in the 21st
Century(Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 272.
8 5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/122,
opened for signature 10 December 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1291.
86 It should be noted that the U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS.
87 Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 4.38.
88 Indeed, when the GATT panel determined that the U.S. actions were too restrictive, or GATT inconsistent, they may have had in mind a cooperative management solution to the dolphin problem. Unfortunately, they failed to spell this out in the dec1s10n.
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in the ETP. The refusal of many coastal states to join IATTC, distrust
of American motives in imposing the trade embargoes (which was
compounded by the feeling that the u.s. was largely responsible for
the dismal state of the yellowfin stocks), and u.s. frustration with
the failure of states in the region to adequately regulate their fishers
all contributed to the intractable nature of the regulatory dilemma
facing the ETP. The GATT challenges were simply the continuation
of these antipathies played out on a different stage.
While the ETP has become a regulatory nightmare, which has
frustrated efforts to protect dolphins and conserve tuna stocks,
lessons can be learned from looking elsewhere. The South Pacific
island states have had much greater success in resisting the
economic muscle of large fishing nations and raising environmental
conservation to an international plane. The experience of these
states in working to ban large-scale pelagic driftnets from their
waters is an instructive and hopeful lesson that states in the ETP
would do well to observe.

IV. LESSONS FROM THE SOUTH PACIFIC
1. Historical Background to the Pelagic Driftnet Convention
The history of the UN Pelagic Driftnet Resolution (the Driftnet
Resolution) 89 is important for four reasons. First, it reveals the
environmentally unfriendly side to American trade embargoes
related to international fisheries. Second, it provides a contextual
insight into the North-South dispute in international environmental
law. Third, it shows how economic concerns can be integrated with
environmental concerns in natural resource management. And
finally, it provides a positive role model for environmental
protection on the international stage. Many of the regulatory
problems currently facing the ETP have been resolved in the South
Pacific.

89 Large-scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine
Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, GA Res. 44/225, UN GAOR, UN ooc.
A/45/663.
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The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) 90 is responsible
for the management of the tuna resources that migrate through the
combined exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of its member states.9 1
The FFA was born and galvanized out of international conflict. In
1976, the u.s. enacted the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (the Magnuson Act). 92 The legislation asserted u.s.
jurisdiction over the living resources within the American EEZ, with
the one notable exception of tuna. The Magnuson Act also refused
to recognize the legitimacy of other states' claims over tuna that
occurred inside their EEZs and allowed the u.s. government to
impose punitive trade sanctions on any nation that took action
against u.s. vessels. Many u.s. vessels continued to fish for tuna
within the EEZs of FFA states under the protection of the Magnuson
Act despite the fact that those states had claimed jurisdiction over
the resources under Article 56 of UNCLOS. Article 56 gives coastal
states exclusive authority to manage the living resources within their
EEZs.93 The motivation for the u.s. policy was fairly simple: The
annual landed value of South Pacific tuna fishery in the 1980s has
been estimated at two billion u.s. dollars. 94 Competition between
technically advanced distant water fishing fleets, such as Taiwan,
Japan, and the u.s., made free access to the resource a matter of
economic importance.
Faced with threats to their sovereign rights, four South Pacific
island states arrested American vessels. 95 In each case, the u.s.
responded by imposing trade embargoes on tuna imported from

90 Convention Establishing the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, 197 8,
reprinted in B. Herr, ed., infra note 101 at 422.
9 l The FFA consists of 17 member states: Australia, the Cook Islands, the
Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New
Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu,
Vanuatu and Western Somoa.
92 16 u.s.c. §§ 1801-1882 (1988).
93 See W.T. Burke, "Highly Migratory Species and the Law of the Sea" (1984)
14 Ocean Dev. & Int'l. L. 273.
9 4 M.L. Lodge, "Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access: Responsible
Fisheries Management in the South Pacific Regions" (1992) 16 Marine Policy 272
at 273.
95 Papua New Guinea arrested the "Danica" in 1982, the Solomon Islands arrested the "Jeanette Diana" in 1984, the Federated States of Micronesia arrested the
"Ocean Pearl" in 1986, and Kirabati took similar action against a U.S. vessel in
1987.
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these countries. The events had two positive consequences for the
South Pacific states. First, their responses, though limited, proved
to be effective. The Solomon Islands, for instance, threatened to bar
all u.s. vessels from its waters and open them instead to vessels from
the Soviet Union.96 Second, the conflict created regional cohesion.
In 1987, the two sides negotiated a settlement of the dispute.97 In
exchange for allowing u.s. vessels into their waters, the member
states of the FFA received recognition of their jurisdiction over their
combined EEZ through licensing and access agreements. The
regional unity that was forged from this conflict has in turn led to
significant international environmental initiatives.
Arvid Pardo has asserted that small, developing states, such as
those in the South Pacific, suffer from "inequitable consequences
deriving from inequalities in technology and access to open seas."9 8
Prior to 1991, distant water fishing nations had exploited their
technological advantage by fishing with large scale pelagic driftnets
within the EEZ of the FFA. Driftnets, sometimes reaching 50 kms in
length, 99 were used because the migratory patterns of tuna are
poorly understood and the species can be widely dispersed.
The ecological impact of driftnets is extremely destructive. The
report of the Secretary General identifies two environmental
problems with this practice. First, the nets are indiscriminate. As
well as targeting tuna fish, the nets are responsible for the significant
bycatch of sea birds, marine mammals and non-target species.
Second, the impact on the target species is equally devastating. In
particular, the report identifies the adverse economic impact the
overexploitation of living resources has on coastal states that are
particularly reliant on sustaining those resources. 100 Large drifrnets
are frequently cut loose in adverse conditions and left to comb the

96 B. M. Tsamenyi, "The Jeanette Diana Dispute" (1986) 16 Ocean Dev. & Int'l.
L. 353.
97 See Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island
States and the Government of the United States, reprinted in K.R. Simmonds, ed.,
New Directions in the Law ofthe Sea [New Series} (New York: Oceana, 1987) at 9.
98 A. Pardo, "Perspectives on Ocean Governance", in J.M. Van Dyke et al, eds.,
Freedom for the High Seas in the 21st Century, supra note 84 at 38.
99 See Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Resources
of the World's Oceans and Seas, Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc. AJ45/663
(1990).
lOO Ibid. at para. 2.
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marine ecosystem. As well, the massive capital expenditure required
to conduct driftnet activities means greater numbers of fish must be
caught to meet expenses. The cycle is vicious and unsustainable.
In response to driftnetting, the FFA banded together and issued
the Tarawa Declaration. 101 The Tarawa Declaration identifies the
practice as "indiscriminate, irresponsible and destructive." The
Tarawa Declaration also links the issue of environmental protection
with the economic interests of the developing states of the FFA,
noting the importance of a sustainable fishery for "this and future
generations of Pacific people." The Declaration called on the
international community to recognize the unsustainable nature of
driftnet fishing and suggested that the ban on driftnet fishing in the
South Pacific "might then be the first step to a comprehensive ban
on such fishing" throughout the world. The Tarawa Declaration
was ratified by all FFA member states in Wellington, New
Zealand. 102
Following adoption of the Wellington Convention driftnets
have virtually disappeared from the waters of the South Pacific. 10 3
The success of the multilateral resolve has been applauded as "an
important step toward international cooperation and the long-term
health of the ecosystem on which we depended." 104

101

Tarawa Declaration, July 1989, reprinted in B. Herr, ed., The Forum
Fisheries Agency: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects (Institute of Pacific
Studies: University of the Pacific, 1990) at 437.
102 Convention to Prohibit Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific, 1989, reprinted
in K.R. Simmonds, ed., New Directions in the Law ofthe Sea [New Series] P. (New
York: Oceana, 1989) 18 [hereinafter the Wellington Convention].
103 See G.J. Hewison, "The Legally Binding Nature of the Moratorium on
Large-Scale High Seas Pelagic Driftnet Fishing" (1994) 25 J. of Maritime L. and
Comm. 557 at 566.
104 J. Carr & M. Gianni, supra note 84 at 273. Judith Swan has written: "The
[Tarawa] Declaration, therefore, was a policy-political decision and strategy, generated by strong regional infrastructure and collectivism. It reflected South Pacific
priorities of sound ecosystems and peoples' welfare over a debate about scientific evidence." See J. Swan, "International Regulation of Driftnet Fishing Activities" in
M. Ross & J.O. Saunders, eds., Growing Demand on a Shrinking Heritage:
Managing Resource-Use Conflicts (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law,
1992) 216 at 240.
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2. International Acceptance of the Dri&net Resolution

The Driftnet Resolution adopted many of the initiatives
expounded in the Wellington Convention. First, it noted both the
destructive impact on non-target species and the economic impact
on developing states who fished on a smaller scale. The Resolution
called for immediate cessation of the activity in the North and
South Pacific and a global moratorium on large-scale driftnet
fishing by June 30, 1992. 10 5
The concerted diplomatic effort to ban driftnet fishing in the
South Pacific has been continued on an international scale. In 1990
the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 45/197. 106 The
resolution reaffirmed the commitment to the global ban called for
in Resolution 44/225. As of 1994, many nations, including some of
the largest offenders, had enacted legislation prohibiting their
nationals from engaging in driftnet fishing on the high seas. 10 7 As
well, many international fisheries organizations have issued
communiques endorsing the moratorium. 108 The accumulation of
support in the international community for the moratorium has led
some scholars to argue that the content of Resolution 44/225 meets
the criteria set out in Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of]ustice109 for customary international law. 110
The success of the South Pacific states in promoting regional
conservation issues on an international scale provides a dramatic
comparison to the present experience in the ETP. There are many
reasons why this is so. First, the South Pacific approach has been
l05 Canada was a strong supporter of the Driftnet Resolution. In its submission,
Canada called for the termination of the wasteful and destructive practice. Canada's
main concern was for conserving salmon stocks which were fished on the high seas
by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. See Submission to the United Nations Office of
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnets (31 August
1990); Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans Press Release, HQ-B-90-14-3
(7 November 1990).
106 Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Resources on
the World's Oceans and Seas, UN Doc. A/C-2/45 6.77 (10 December 1990).
l07 These nations include Japan, Taiwan, the former Soviet Union and the EU.
See G.J. Hewison, supra note 103 at 576.
108 G.J. Hewison, ibid. at 573.
109 Statute of the International Court ofjustice, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 899 (1972).
110 G.J. Hewison argues that accepting the morarorium is a general practice recognized as obligatory by a majority of states. See generally G.J. Hewison, supra note
103.
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one of multilateral cooperation. The ETP has remained mired in
regional distrust. Second, the South Pacific initiative took a
comprehensive eco-system approach. The Wellington Convention
recognized that the destruction caused by driftnet fishing could not
be addressed through attempts to limit the kill of a particular
species. The Wellington Convention addresses both the
environmental issues of wasteful incidental bycatch and the
economic issue of overexploitation of the tuna resources. The u.s.
approach in attempting to regulate only dolphin kill without regard
to the state of the yellowfin stocks has only deepened the divisions
in the ETP. Until there is recognition by the countries in the ETP
that the two species are inseparable in the eco-system, and that an
effort to reduce dolphin kill must also consider the precarious state
of the tuna, further cooperation in the region is unlikely. Third, the
international community recognized the soundness of the South
Pacific approach. The U.S has reported that the driftnet moratoria
in the South Pacific and the corresponding reduction in the
albacore catch is expected to benefit u.s. fishers by an increase in
prices because of the smaller harvests and a long-term sustainable
fishety in which albacore populations are expected to rise. 111 Finally,
the similarities between the regions should not be ignored. The
South Pacific initiative came in response to an economic and
environmental crisis. Stocks of albacore tuna, on which the region is
highly dependent, were reported to be in threat of serious
depletion. 112 It has been frequently observed that conservation only
becomes part of fishery policy in response to crises. 11 3 The ETP is
now faced with a similar crisis. Failure to regulate the resource
through multilateral cooperation may well solve the dolphin
problem at the expense of the tuna: there simply will be no more
tuna left to fish.

See usrTc Report, supra note 9 at xi.
See J. Swan, supra note 104 at 221.
See, for e.g., H.D. Smith, "Theory of Ocean Management" in P. Fabbri, ed.,
Ocean Management in Global Change (London: Elsevier Applied Science
Publishers, 1993) 19.
11 1

112
11 3
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V. CONCLUSION
The Wellington Convention may only survive by the grace of
having avoided the GATT. Article 3(2)(c) of the Convention allows
all parties to prohibit the importation of fish products caught with
driftnets. Embargoes enacted under this provision would not
withstand a challenge under the GATT. Nevertheless, many member
states have implemented such legislation. 114 As well, nations outside
the South Pacific, including the United States, 11 5 have followed the
lead of the South Pacific states. The fact that the GATT exists as an
available mechanism to undermine the Wellington Convention and
yet has not been used is a further testimony to the strength of the
international resolve to support the moratorium on driftnet fishing.
In the end, the experience of the driftnet moratorium is
instructive for both the ETP fishery and the GA TT itself. The
contracting parties to the GATT and the interpreters of the GATT
should recognize the international consensus embodied in
Resolution 45/225. The GATT must be either amended or
interpretative direction must be supplied to permit trade embargoes
that are consistent with international environmental initiatives and
multilateral agreements. By undermining these agreements rather
than providing valuable support for them, the GATT will continue to
impede the development of effective international environmental
law, which, after all, embodies the same multilateral consensus that
is the foundation of the GATT.

114

These states include Australia and the Cook Islands. New Zealand considered
such measures unenforceable in light of the GATT decision in Tuna/Dolphin I, and
Papua New Guinea declined to implement supporting legislation for fear that its
processing industry would suffer economic harm. See G.J. Hewison, supra note 103
at 576.
115 The U.S. implemented legislation banning importation of driftnet products
into its territory in 1991. See High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, amending 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1991).

